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King Kirby and the Amazin’ Terminatin’ Copyrights: Who Will Prevail?!?
By Jay Goldberg
“There is a war coming. Are you sure you’re on the right
side?”1
-Wolverine

I.

Introduction

power to exploit a copyright enables its possessor to reap
untold profits, the battle between the parties rages fierce.
While artists may not have the ability to summon superstrength or x-ray vision to their aide in this conflict,
they may in certain circumstances exercise their right
of copyright termination under the Copyright Act of
1976 (“the Act”) to regain control of their creations.3
This, however, oftentimes proves more
difficult that it might initially seem, as
publishers are not without their own
arsenal of statutory powers.

Studies in dualism
permeate the history of comic
book storytelling: the righteous
Superman does battle with the
This article elucidates this
evil mastermind Lex Luthor; the
aspect
of
the conflict between artist
benevolent Batman combats the
and publisher, specifically focusing on
destructive and nihilistic Joker; the
the ongoing legal struggle between the
compassionate Professor Charles
heirs of comic book artist Jack Kirby
Xavier and apocalyptic Magneto
and Marvel Entertainment.4 First,
engage in a struggle by which the
this article gives a brief introduction
very future of humanity hangs
to the Kirby litigation, focusing on
in the balance! While these epic
the origins of the conflict and the
confrontations play out on the
relevant legal issues. Next, this essay
pages of comic books a similar, yet
discusses the pertinent provisions of
less simplistic, battle occurs in real
copyright and trademark law, focusing
life: the artist versus the publisher
specifically on copyright termination,
in the battle for copyrights. While
the derivative works exception, and
the real-life conflict may not
the Lanham Act, as well as utilizing
place the fate of humanity at risk,
case law to examine the application of
it does implicate an important
A Creative Commons-licensed photo
the legal concepts. Finally, this essay
and pervasive aspect of our society:
by Flickr user Devlin Thompson
applies
the relevant doctrines to the Kirby
money. Simply put, the storylines
litigation, concluding that while copyright law may vest
and characters developed by the comic book industry
the Kirby heirs with a right to partially reclaim their
are big business. From simple, paperback origins comic
father’s creations, the derivative works exception and
books have spawned television shows, merchandise,
2
the Lanham Act significantly weaken the value of that
videogames, and most lucratively, movies. As the
1. X-Men (Twentieth Century Fox 2000).
2. See generally Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the “Summer of the
Spinoff” Came to Be: The Branding of Characters in American Mass
Media, 23 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 301 (2003) (discussing the conglomeration of the entertainment business, whereby proven entertainment commodities and properties are reused as often as possible
in order to maximize profits, recognizing the extremely valuable
nature of brand name characters). See also The Internet Movie
Database, All-Time Box Office: World-wide, http://www.imdb.
com/boxoffice/alltimegross?region=world-wide (last visited Apr. 4,
2010) (noting that some of the top worldwide grossing movies of
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all time were based on comic books, for example, The Dark Knight
($1,001,921,825), Spider-Man 3 ($885,430,303), and Spider-Man
($806,700,000)).
3. The United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2005)
(granting an artist, or their specifically-designated heir, the right
to terminate a copyright “at any time during a period of five years
beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was
originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever is
later” if the copyright was executed before January 1, 1978).
4. Complaint at 1, Kirby v. Marvel Entm’t, Inc., Case No.
10-00289-CJC-AN (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 9, 2010).
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right. This article concludes by calling on Congress to
revisit the relevant copyright and trademark provisions
and comport them with one another in order to prevent
the further devaluation of a reclaimed copyright by
competing trademark interests.
II.
The Comic Book Industry and Kirby v. Marvel
Entertainment, Inc.
Like any fledgling upstart, the American
comic book industry comes from humble and rocky
beginnings. The early industry was plagued by
disorganization and many times publishers operated
under a “gentleman’s agreement” with their artists,
whereby the artists and the publisher would achieve
a general understanding that the artist would be
compensated for his work, foregoing any formal
contract.5 Many artists responsible for the “Golden
Era” of the comic book industry sold their creations to
publishers on this basis and consequently regretted the
manner in which they conducted their business.6 Jack
Kirby’s heirs allege that he was one of these artists.
Mr. Kirby, widely known as “King Kirby”
amongst his colleagues, is directly responsible for some
of the most famous and lucrative comic book characters
of all time. From 1958 to 1963, Mr. Kirby either
authored or co-authored works containing the characters
The Fantastic Four, X-Men, Iron Man, Spider-Man,
The Incredible Hulk, Thor, The Avengers, Nick Fury,
and Ant-Man (“Kirby Works”).7 At the time of their
creation, Mr. Kirby’s heirs claim that Mr. Kirby was
working on a freelance basis and never committed to any
5. See Ashok Chandra, Crisis of Indefinite Consequence: How
the Derivative Works Exception and the Lanham Act Undercut the
Remunerative Value of Termination of Transfers, 16 Fordham Intell.
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 241, 267 (2005) (stating that during the
Golden Age of comic books, work made for hire agreements were
not the norm); Brooks Barnes and Michael Cieply, A Supersized
Custody Battle Over Marvel Superheroes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/business/21marvel.html?8dpc
(quoting Kirby attorney Marc Toberoff as contending that “an
industrywide decency code put so much pressure on Marvel that
few at the company were worrying about contractual niceties with
artists.”).
6. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that the heirs of Jerome Seigel, one of
the co-creators of Superman, were entitled to a share of the U.S.
copyright of that character, despite previous agreements between
the parties); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir.
2002) (recognizing Joseph Simon’s right of termination in Captain
America, despite a prior settlement of an authorship dispute).
7. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 19. See generally The
Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com (last visited April
4, 2010) (noting generally that a significant number of Mr. Kirby’s
creation have become lucrative movie properties).

written agreement to create works directly for Marvel’s
predecessors.8
In 1972, Mr. Kirby entered into an agreement
with Marvel’s predecessor whereby he assigned his
interests in the Kirby Works and the original copyrights
to the company and received further compensation.9
On September 19, 2009, the Kirby heirs, pursuant
to 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), served Marvel with notices of
termination of the copyrights of all the Kirby Works to
take effect at the expiration of the statutory period.10
These terminations serve as the basis of the lawsuit at
hand and, if effective, will dictate the extent to which
Mr. Kirby’s heirs may recover under his legacy.
In the section of the complaint pertinent to
this essay, the Kirby heirs put forth two claims for
relief. First, the heirs seek a declaratory judgment that
the notices of termination are effective pursuant to 17
U.S.C. § 304(c).11 Second, noting that a declaratory
judgment on the first claim would result in a jointownership of the Kirby Works copyrights, the heirs ask
the court to define “profits” for the purpose of the parties
accounting to one another on future monetary gains.12
As is shown in the sections that follow, the success or
failure of these claims turns primarily on the court’s
application of a number of legal doctrines, including
aspects of both copyright and trademark law.
III.

The Underlying Legal Concepts
A.

Copyright Termination, Works for Hire,
and the Derivative Works Exception
under the Copyright Act of 1976

Copyrights are meant to protect “original works
of authorship in any tangible medium of expression”
and include, non-exhaustively, works of literary, graphic,
musical, or dramatic merit.13 The Copyright Act of
1976 empowers an author, and his or her heirs, with
8. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 22 (asserting further
that Mr. Kirby “worked solely on a freelance basis out of his own
home, with his own instruments and materials and thereby bore the
financial risk of creating his copyrighted materials.”).
9. Id. at ¶ 24.
10. Id. at ¶ 25. See also 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (applying the statutory
time period, note that the Kirby Works would be subject to termination from 2014-2019, 56 years from the original copyrights).
11. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶¶ 30-33.
12. Id. at ¶¶ 34-37.
13. § 102(a). See also Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’n 111 F.2d
432 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that the character of Superman was
protected under copyright law); Emerson, supra note 13, at 214
(mentioning that “graphic representations of characters are inherently expressive and thus considered copyrightable works.”).
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the exclusive right to (a) reproduce their work, (b)
produce derivative works based off the original work,
and (c) display or otherwise perform their work.14 Once
an author obtains a copyright, he may assign those
rights to a third party.15 Nevertheless, the 1976 Act
permits an author, or his statutory heirs, to terminate
the transferred copyright after 56 years (if the copyright
was created before January 1, 1978).16 A termination
allows an author to recapture the copyright and either
exploit the profits garnered from that copyright,
renegotiate the terms of the copyright assignment, or
assign the copyright to another party.17 Importantly,
as the Supreme Court recognized in Mills Music, Inc. v.
Snyder,18 unlike other rights an author cannot contract
away or assign the right of termination.19 Despite this, it
can still be difficult for an author or his heirs to exercise
the termination right, as many statutory details must be
complied with.20
There are two major exceptions to the right of
termination found in § 304(c) of the 1976 Act, both
of which can seriously reduce the value of a terminated
copyright. First, the Act expressly prohibits an author
of a “work made for hire” from exercising a termination
right on their creation.21 Instead, a work for hire
vests the rights of copyright in the employer. A work
made for hire is defined as “a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment”
or “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work.”22 If an author
creates a work and then later assigns the copyright to a
publisher, however, the publisher may not retroactively
14. § 106. See also Lauren Beth Emerson, Termination of Transfer
of Copyright: Able to Leap Trademarks in a Single Bound?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 207, 213 (2006).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2005).
16. § 304(c).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2005). See also Emerson, supra note 13,
at 207.
18. 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985) (noting that the termination
right exists primarily to protect an author from “the consequences
of ill-advised and unprofitable grants that had been made before
the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his
work product.”).
19. § 304(c)(3), (5).
20. See Emerson, supra note 13, at 221 (recognizing that for a
termination right to be properly executed, it must be done within
a five-year window in which termination is permitted and the terminating party must give between two and ten years notice before
the termination becomes effective, pointing out that when there are
multiple or renegotiated agreements between the relevant parties
this time period can be difficult to identify).
21. § 304(c).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
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deem the work a work made for hire.23
In Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon,24 the court
permitted the exercise of an author’s termination right
despite a prior agreement between the parties that the
works in question were works done for hire. Joseph
Simon, the creator of the popular comic book character
Captain America, sought to terminate a copyright
transfer he granted to Timely Publications, a successor
to Marvel Comics.25 In a settlement agreement from
a previous litigation, Simon acknowledged that he
contributed to the Captain America character as an
employee for hire and not on a freelance basis.26 Despite
this previous agreement, the court permitted Simon to
present evidence that he did not, in fact, create Captain
America as a work for hire and that the settlement
agreement was an arrangement between the parties after
the character’s creation.27 Noting that under § 304(c)(5)
of the 1976 Act an author cannot contract away his right
to termination, the court permitted Mr. Simon to effect
terminations, holding that the settlement agreement,
which deemed the work a work for hire after its creation,
was ineffective.28
The second important exception to the right of
termination, pertinent especially in the context of comic
books, eliminates the right for derivative works created
by the copyright holder prior to the exercise of the
termination.29 A derivative work is defined as “a work
based upon one or more preexisting works.”30 Generally
speaking, a derivative work must be “an original work of
authorship,”31 although a derivative author is not under a
requirement to greatly change the original work in order
to receive independent copyright protection.32 While
23. See Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding that even though the creators of a comic strip
revised and expanded the original material at the request of the
publisher, this was not tantamount to a finding that the strip was a
work for hire).
24. 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 283.
27. Id. at 292.
28. Id.
29. § 304(c)(6)(A). See also Chandra, supra note 5, at 278 (utilizing the example of the Superman movie, a derivative work based off
of the comic book, which held its own copyright distinct from the
comic book copyright).
30. § 101.
31. § 101. But see Chandra, supra note 5, at 279 (noting that
divining what elements are to be considered part of the original and
which are unique to the derivative has proven to be a difficult task).
32. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 5455 (2d Cir. 1936) (recognizing that there is no “novelty, creative or
aesthetic requirement for copyright in a derivative work.”). See also,
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the courts have, as of yet, not indentified the full extent
of what constitutes a derivative work, it could potentially
be construed broadly to encompass written story
elements and character traits, as well as the illustrative
representation of any graphical characters.33
In Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., the court
limited the extent of an asserted termination right
under the derivative works doctrine.34 The heirs of
Jerome Siegel, one of the creators of Superman, sought
a declaration that they had successful terminated Mr.
Siegel’s half of the original copyright.35 In partially
granting the plaintiffs’ claim, the court was forced to
deal with various aspects of the copyright, including
international revenues and derivative works.36 While
addressing the issue of international revenues and
copyrights, the court cited the 1976 Act and limited
the plaintiff’s termination recovery to only those profits
realized by the domestic exploitation of the Superman
Action Comics, Vol. 1 copyright.37 The court did not
address what to do, accounting-wise, with any alteration
in pre-termination derivative work. However, it
did hold that profits garnered by the publisher from
unaltered pre-termination derivative works were not
subject to accounting with the plaintiffs.38
It is clear that the doctrines of work for hire and
derivative works limit the value of a copyright recaptured
by an author through exercise of a termination right.
Given that the Simon court held that a work was not a
work for hire even though the publisher deemed it so
after the fact, the modern comic book industry now
makes it standard practice for publishers to require
their artists to enter work for hire agreements up front,
therefore limiting an author’s ability to profit from his
own work..39 The derivative works exception presents
Chandra, supra note 5, at 280.
33. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 277-78.
34. 542 F.Supp.2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
35. Id. (granting the plaintiffs a copyright termination only
with respect to character and story elements as introduced in Action Comics Vol. 1). See also Michael Cieply, Ruling Gives Heirs a
Share of Superman Copyright, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/business/media/29comics.html?_
r=3&ref=business&oref=slogin (noting that the court in Siegel upheld the heirs’ copyright in the material published in Action Comics
Vol. 1 only and did not determine the extent to which later versions
of the character were derived from the original iteration).
36. Id. at 1139-43.
37. Id. at 1140 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(E)).
38. Id. at 1142-43.
39. See, e.g., DC Comics, Submissions/Talent Search, http://dccomics.com/about/submissions.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) (noting that DC will not accept unsolicited artwork or writing).

additional difficulty when applied to the comic book
industry, as by their very nature, comic book characters
continually evolve and change with every new issue.
Therefore, it is not a stretch to imagine a court accepting
the argument that a character as it exists today is far
different from the character as originally copyrighted by
the author, thus seriously diminishing the value of the
recaptured copyright.40
B.
Overlap

Trademark Protection and Copyright

In addition to copyright law, trademark
law provides another method by which publishers
may diminish the value of a recaptured copyright.
Trademarks, by definition, are any identifiable articles
that symbolize, and are readily associated with, a specific
brand or producer of goods.41 Under the Lanham Act,
individuals and companies are prevented from using
the distinctive marks of other entities in commercial
activity without permission.42 Unlike copyright law,
which protects an image itself, trademark law is meant to
protect the consumer and the goodwill of the company
who owns the mark.43 Therefore, rather than provide
total coverage against the usage of the mark, only certain
usages are prohibited.44 Also different from a copyright,
a trademark is infinite in its duration and never expires
so long as the entity that owns the mark continues to
exploit that mark in the marketplace.45 An owner may
additionally lose a trademark through genericide, or the
inclusion of the mark into the cultural lexicon.46
It is widely accepted that comic book characters
are protected by trademark in some situations. In
DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc.,
the court held that Superman and Wonder Woman
40. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 283 (mentioning that in 1986
DC Comics “killed off” all of its characters only to recreate them
again in the next issue, noting that because of this DC could claim
that it authored all of the characters it now publishes).
41. See Emerson, supra note 13, at 223 (offering that trademarks
can be “words, symbols, logos, sounds, scents, or even colors.”).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
43. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 271 (pointing out that a trademark does not protect the character of Mickey Mouse, but instead
the good will of Disney).
44. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (holding that the use of a brand name in the description of a product is
not trademark infringement).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
46. See, e.g., King-Seeley v. Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (refusing to find a trademark infringement
in the defendant’s usages of the word “thermos” as the word had
become the generic term for describing the good itself rather than
the source of the item).
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were protected trademarks of DC Comics.47 The
defendant ran a singing telegram service, which featured
characters that bore strong resemblance to Superman
and Wonder Woman and were unlicensed by DC. In
their discussion, the court noted that the characters
had long been associated with and utilized by DC in
the marketing of their products. Additionally, the
court recognized that DC carefully chooses when, and
to whom, to license usage of the marks.48 The court
noted that the trademark was not limited simply to the
physical appearance of the characters, but also included
the name, phrases, logos, and design marks associated
with them.49
While trademark law is limited in its application,
it can significantly weaken the value of recaptured
copyright. Although no court has directly addressed
the issue of when copyright and trademark law
overlap in this realm, it appears likely that trademark
protection would interfere somewhat with an author’s
recaptured copyright.50 As the court in Unlimited
Monkey Business recognized, comic book characters and
their distinguishing features have long since become
associated with their publishers and when used in
commerce indicate an implicit approval of the product
by the company that owns the mark.51 In the event
that an author, upon successful termination, decides not
to license a copyrighted character back to the original
publisher he would not be able to start releasing comic
books or other materials of his own, as the publisher
would retain the trademarks associated with the
character.52 In cases such as Kirby, as shown below, this
may present significant difficulty for an artist.
IV.

Application to Kirby

47. 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
48. Id. at 113.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc. 481 F. Supp.
1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that the trademark protection of
an image of a character may persist even though the copyrightable
character had previously entered the public domain, so long as the
mark possesses an independent value). But see In re DC Comics,
Inc. 689 F.2d 1042, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Neis, J., concurring)
(“[I]f trademark rights are recognized in a picture of a product, the
design itself may be perpetually protected, contrary to the limited
term afforded to some designs under the copyright or design patent
statutes.”).
51. See 542 F.Supp.2d at 1098.
52. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 275 (pointing out that even
though copyright law dictates that upon termination the image
should return to the original author, any subsequent publication or
licensing of that image would be in violation of trademark law, as
most comic book characters have become synonymous with their
long time publishers).
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Before reaching the issues present in the relevant
aspects of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the court must
first decide whether the Kirby heirs possess a right of
termination in the first place. This turns, in essence,
on two issues: did Jack Kirby originally produce the
characters as a freelance artist or as works for hire, and if
he did produce them as a freelance artist does his estate
still possess his right to termination? As the 1976 Act
states, the right of termination does not apply to works
for hire.53 In such a case, the copyrights belong to the
publisher, who is deemed the author of the works.54 If,
on the other hand, Mr. Kirby produced the works with
his own materials and on his on initiative, then his heirs
undoubtedly possess the right to reclaim the original
copyright.55 As discovery has yet to be conducted in the
case, there is no way to know for sure whether the Kirbys
obeyed all the statutory demands of § 304(c). Therefore,
in order to focus on deeper legal implications, this article
continues on the assumption that all facts alleged in the
complaint are accurate.
In the complaint, the Kirby estate claims that
Mr. Kirby created the works at his own expense and not
as works for hire.56 While the reply of the defendant
is not currently available, it is likely that Marvel will
contend that Mr. Kirby produced the works in the stead
of his employment with Marvel. Barring some clearcut evidence to the contrary, it is unlikely that the court
will side with the defendant on this issue. Given the
widely recognized state of the industry at the time of
the creation of the Kirby Works, it is likely that Marvel’s
predecessors purchased the works from Kirby on a
consignment basis.57
After finding that the works were produced
as freelance works subject to termination, the court
will then have to move on to the effect of the 1972
assignment of the copyrights from Mr. Kirby to the
publisher.58 In this agreement, Mr. Kirby assigned
his interest in the copyrights to the publisher for
compensation in addition to his original payments
53. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
54. U.S. Copyright Office, Works Made For Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010).
55. § 304(c)(6)(C).
56. Complaint at ¶ 23, Kirby v. Marvel Entm’t, Inc., Case No.
10-00289-CJC-AN (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 9, 2010).
57. See supra note 5. Which cite in note 5 is this referring to? Provide author name plus pincite. Supra should not be used for cases,
per R.4.2. This refers to note 5 as a whole, not any particular cite
therein. Maybe it can refer to the page of text, not the cite?
58. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 24.
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from Marvel. The court should not have a problem
in holding that this assignment has no effect on the
plaintiff’s ability to exercise the termination right of
the original copyright, as under § 304(c)(5) of the
1976 Act, regardless of any prior agreement to the
contrary an author may effect termination of an original
copyright.59 Assuming that the Kirbys have complied
will all statutory demands contained within § 304, as
they allege, the court must then deal with the effect of
the terminations.
The effect of the Kirby terminations will be
significantly tempered by the derivative works provision
of the 1976 Act and by the relevant aspects of trademark
law. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs essentially ask
the court to include any profits made by the defendant
from exploitation of any new derivative work, either
domestically or overseas, if the overseas profits result
from the “predicate exercise in the United States of any
right under the copyright[s].”60 The plaintiffs, as they
must, concede that they do not possess a right to monies
gained from the exploitation of derivative works created
before the exercise of the termination.61 Therefore,
the value of the termination will turn in part on how
liberally the court decides to apply the derivative works
exception.62
As recognized earlier, comic book characters
inherently evolve from issue to issue. As an example,
it stands to reason that the Wolverine of The Incredible
Hulk #181 is a far different animal than the Wolverine
of X-Men Origins: Wolverine.63 With each incarnation,
Marvel could potentially argue that the Wolverine
of Mr. Kirby’s creation no longer exists. The current
manifestation of the character, the argument goes, is
a derivate work that the publisher itself created and
may continue to exploit on its own.64 Although not
controlling, when considered in connection with the
Siegel case, it seems likely that the court would limit the
recovered copyright to those elements apparent in the
59. See also Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d
1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d
280 (2d Cir. 2002).
60. Kirby, Case No. 10-00289-CJC-AN at ¶ 66.
61. § 304(c)(6)(A).
62. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 278.
63. The Incredible Hulk #181 marks the first appearance of the
character of Wolverine as a mutant agent of the Canadian government. The most recent incarnation of the character in the film
X-Men Origins: Wolverine presents Wolverine as a Canadian-born
mutant, who leaves Canada and comes to the United States, joining
the American military.
64. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 282-83.

initial personification of the characters.65 While it is
unlikely that the court would count the entire catalogue
of characters as new and unique derivative creations,
the extent of the reclaimed copyright will likely be
significantly narrowed as a result of the court’s findings.
Additionally, using Siegel as a barometer, it
is likely that the court will limit the plaintiffs’ right
to those profits realized solely from the domestic
exploitation of the joint copyright.66 This significantly
weakens the value of the reclaimed copyright, as a
considerable portion of the value derives from the
international film market.67 Although plaintiffs limit
their request to overseas profits predicated on the
exercise of the copyright in the United States, given
the clear language of the 1976 Act this may be murky
territory that the court decides to avoid.68
In addition to devaluation due to copyright
provisions, the applicable aspects of trademark law
might further devalue any recognition of termination
by the court.69 In the decades since characters such as
the X-Men or The Incredible Hulk burst onto the scene,
their appearances and related identifying characteristics
have become synonymous with the Marvel brand.
Further, these characters are extremely unique and
for the most part are in constant use, so the concepts
of genericide and loss through inactivity are not an
issue. Therefore, despite the termination by the Kirby
estate, the plaintiffs would be unable to produce works
featuring the distinct elements of the characters without
running afoul of Marvel’s trademark rights.70 This
reduces the alienability of the newly-reclaimed rights, as
well as places the Kirbys at a disadvantage should they
decide to renegotiate terms with Marvel.
All of this leads to the conclusion that even
though the court will likely find that the Kirby heirs
have properly asserted their termination right on
the original copyrights, the value of those rights are
significantly reduced. Simply looking at the derivative
rights exception, the reclamation will likely be limited
to only those characteristics of the superheroes present
65. See supra note 5.
66. See supra notes 35-38.
67. See, e.g., Box Office Mojo, X-Men Origins: Wolverine, http://
www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=wolverine.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010) (noting that the movie X-Men Origins: Wolverine
made $179,883,157 domestically and $193,179,412 internationally
for a total worldwide box office of $373,062,569).
68. § 304(c)(6)(E).
69. See supra notes 40-51.
70. See Chandra, supra note 5, at 274-75.
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in the original works. Given the nature of comic book
storytelling, these original creations are far different
from the heroes that grace present-day movie screens,
comic book pages, and videogames. It remains a
possibility that Marvel will argue, successfully, that the
relinquished copyrights are no longer as lucrative as
they once were, thus reducing the amount that Marvel
will be responsible for in accounting to the Kirby
estate. The copyright is further devalued when rights to
international profits are denied, as will likely be the case.

from its investments. Either way, it is clear that when
trademark law interferes with an author’s reclaimed
copyright, it undermines the intent of Congress and
undercuts the author’s ability to rightfully claim the
fruits of his hard work. Given the increasingly lucrative
nature of comic book-based branded entertainment,
Congress must revisit both trademark and copyright law
in order to ensure that the forefathers of the comic book
industry are properly recognized for their work.

When factoring in the additional constraints
trademark law places upon the usefulness of the
recaptured copyright, it appears as though the Kirby
estate is left with only two viable options: either relicense
the copyrights back to Marvel from a disadvantaged
bargaining position, or pump more money into litigating
the precise terms of the accounting between the parties.
Given that Disney now owns Marvel, in the likely event
that the court recognizes an effective termination of
copyright it would behoove the Kirbys to pursue the
former option with their corporate opposition. Given
the decreased bargaining strength that accompanies only
being able to negotiate with one corporate party, it is
unlikely that the Kirbys will reap the rewards they might
have without the interference of trademark law.
In 1958, Jack Kirby had no idea that his
creations would spawn a multibillion-dollar worldwide
industry. Congress enacted § 304(c) of the 1976 Act in
order to give authors, such as Mr. Kirby, the opportunity
to reap the benefits of the continued success of their
work.71 In the context of the comic book industry,
however, the competing interests of trademark law
significantly frustrate this goal. Rather than place the
author in an advanced bargaining position, trademark
law essentially eliminates the alienability of the reclaimed
copyright. This forces the author, or his heirs, to simply
renegotiate terms with the publisher from a position
of disadvantaged bargaining power. This frustrates the
intent of Congress in passing the 1976 Act.
V.

Conclusion

The battle of author versus publisher lacks the
stark dualism apparent in the pages of comic books,
in that its parties may not be easily classified as right
and wrong, benevolent and parsimonious, or good and
evil. While an author, or in many cases their estate, has
an undeniable interest in the success of their creations,
a publisher likewise possesses an interest in profiting
71. See supra note 18.
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